Purni Devi & Anr v. Babu Ram & Anr
Supreme Court of India | 2024 SCC Online SC 482
Background facts
▪ The origins of this case trace back to June 1, 1984, when the predecessors in interest of Purni Devi (Plaintiffs) filed a suit for possession against Babu Ram & Anr (Defendants).
▪ On December 10, 1986, the suit was decreed in favor of the Plaintiff, directing the Defendants to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the property. The said decree was challenged by the Defendants by way of a first appeal, which was later dismissed by the District Judge, Kathua, on February 9, 1990, and their second appeal was also dismissed by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir (HC) on November 9, 2000, rendering the decree final.
▪ On December 18, 2000, the Plaintiff's predecessor filed an execution application before the Tehsildar (Settlement), Hiranagar, which was rejected on January 29, 2005, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Subsequently, the Plaintiff filed a fresh execution application before the Munsiff Court, Hiranagar, on October 3, 2005, which was dismissed as barred by limitation under the provisions of the Limitation Act. This decision of dismissal was affirmed by the HC on April 9, 2018 (Impugned Order).
▪ Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Plaintiffs filed an appeal before the Supreme Court (SC) challenging the order of the Munsiff Court, Hiranagar.
Issue at hand?
▪ Whether the period spent pursuing the execution application before the Tehsildar (Settlement) should be excluded when computing the limitation period for filing the execution application before the appropriate court?
Decision of the Court
▪ At the outset, the SC noted that the Munsiff Court determined that the period of limitation for filing an execution application was governed by Article 182 of the J&K Limitation Act, 1938, which provides a 3-year limitation period, rather than the 12 year period under Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). Thus, the Munsiff Court found the application is time-barred as it was not filed within 3 years from the dismissal of the second appeal.
▪ The SC then observed the HC, in its Impugned Order, upheld the view of Munsiff Court, stating that the limitation period for the first execution application is governed by Article 182. The HC also rejected the Plaintiff's argument for the exclusion of time spent before the Tehsildar under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
▪ The SC analyzed Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which is applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and allows for the exclusion of time spent pursuing a matter in good faith before a wrong forum. The SC then placed reliance upon the case of Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principle Secy, Irrigation Department1, which established the conditions for application under Section 14: (a) both proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party; (b) the prior proceeding was pursued with due diligence and in good faith; (c) the failure of the prior proceeding was due to jurisdictional defects; (d) the earlier and latter proceedings relate to the same matter; and (e) both proceedings were before a court.
▪ Upon examining the facts of the case, SC found no substantial evidence of bad faith or negligence on the part of the Plaintiff in approaching the Tehsildar. It noted that the Plaintiff had filed the matter diligently and in a bona fide manner before the forum it believed to have jurisdiction.
▪ Therefore, SC held that the period from December 18, 2000, to January 29, 2005, during which the Plaintiff pursued the execution application before the Tehsildar, should be excluded when computing the limitation period.
▪ The SC then relied upon the case ofLaxmi Srinivasa R and P Boiled Rice Mill v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr2 which adhered to the directives laid down in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principle Secy, Irrigation Department and M.P Steel Corporation v. CCE3 ,wherein, it was emphasized that interpretation of Section 14 must be made to further the cause of justice rather than putting an end to the proceedings.
▪ In view of the above, the SC held that the limitation period was excluded with consideration that the application by Plaintiff's predecessor was filed with genuine and bona fide intention and the court is bound to exclude such period while quantifying the total limitation period.
Halliburton India Operations Pvt Ltd v. Vision Projects Technologies Pvt Ltd
Bombay High Court | Commercial Appeal (L) No. 17720 of 2024
Background facts
▪ Halliburton Indian Operations (Appellant) had secured a tender from the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and subsequently subcontracted the project to Vision Projects Technologies Pvt Ltd (Respondent) vide a sub-contract dated September 18, 2018 (sub-contract). The Respondent was to provide services using its Platform Supply Vessel (PSV), which required conversion into a Well Stimulation Vessel (WSV) with specialized equipment that the Appellant was responsible for installing, maintaining, and removing.
▪ A subsequent regulatory change restricted Offshore Support Vessels from carrying certain chemicals, unless reassessed and certified under the Offshore Service Vessel Chemical Code, and although an initial exemption was granted, further compliance required the installation of lifeboats by March 31, 2023. When extensions were not granted, the Respondent invoked the Force Majeure clause on April 3, 2023, and the Appellant did the same as per both, the main contract and the sub-contract, which the Respondent rejected.
▪ Due to the refusal to extend compliance beyond May 31, 2023, the vessel was docked on June 01, 2023, and the Appellant issued a termination notice to the Respondent on August 07, 2023. ONGC rejected the Appellant's force majeure invocation, and the Respondent maintained that the Appellant was liable for charter payments from June 2023 until the equipment was removed.
▪ Subsequently, in March 2024, the Appellant sought interim reliefs under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act), seeking permission to remove the equipment owned by the Appellant and restrain the Respondent from cold laying the vessel at any port.
▪ However, the Single Judge, vide an order dated May 06, 2023 denied granting the aforementioned interim relief, in light of the fact that the termination of the sub-contract was not in accordance with the clauses provided therein. Furthermore, the Single Judge also reasoned that the interim relief sought, if granted, would amount to grant of final relief in favor of the Appellant, which is impermissible in law.
▪ The Appellant, aggrieved by the said order of the Single Judge, then filed a Commercial Appeal under Section 37 of the Act before the Bombay High Court (Court), challenging the denial of interim relief by the Single Judge. Hence, the present appeal.
Issues at hand?
▪ Whether the Appeal from the order of the Single Judge, under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, would be permissible in law?
▪ Whether the Appellant was entitled to the relief prayed for under Section 9 of the Act.
Decision of the Court
▪ After hearing the submissions made by the advocates appearing for both the parties and perusing the documentary material on record, the Court noted that considering the scope of interference permissible under Section 37(1)(b) of the Act, the Appellant was not entitled for the interim reliefs sought under Section 9 of the Act.
▪ The Court noted that the present appeal was an appeal filed against exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Act, which as per the decision held in Wander Ltd and Anr v. Antox India Pvt Ltd4 , should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court. Further, the Court opined that, in light of the same, the appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act is limited to cases where the lower court's order was arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or ignored settled legal principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions.
▪ Accordingly, the Court found that the Single Judge's denial of the interim relief was not arbitrary or capricious, but rather the Single Judge had carefully considered the facts and circumstances, including the terms of the sub-contract and the nature of the relief sought by the Appellant, before rejecting the same.
▪ Additionally, the Court also examined the relevant facts and circumstances of the dispute between the parties, before upholding the observations made by the Single Judge while refusing to grant any interim measures as prayed by the Appellant.
▪ Therefore, the Court dismissed the present appeal and directed the parties to bear their own costs.
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Footnotes
1.(2008) 7 SCC 169
2. 2022 SCC Online SC 1790
3. (2015) 7 SCC 58
4. 1990 (Supp) SCC 727
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